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Terence McKenna, in Wild Ducks Flying Backwards, said that he did not believe that 
the world is made of quarks or electro-magnetic waves, or stars, or planets, or of any 
such things. ’I believe’ he said, ‘the world is made of language.’ It would have been 
more correct to have said that the world is made of languages, many of them. 
 
The subject, Law and Language in a Multilingual Society, raises critical issues not 
only for us in this country but also for others because language is part – the greater 
part – of one's culture. A people without a culture is said to be like a zebra without 
stripes. Culture, and not race, nationality, religion or border (natural or political), 
determines one's identity. As one of the founding fathers of the Afrikaans language, 
Rev SJ du Toit, wrote in 1891: language is a portrait of the soul and life of a nation; 
and it mirrors the character and intellectual development of a people (my translation). 
 
Unfortunately language tends to divide, more particularly, a multilingual society. Law 
is supposed to close the divide but more often than not widens it and is used to 
deepen divisions. This is because the ruler determines the law and, consequently, 
the language of the law, in the belief that the use of language can be enforced from 
above. Law and language, like oil and water, do not mix although the former is 
dependent on the latter. 
 
The reason this paper is in English may have had its origin in an incident at the 
Pretoria Bar, of which I had been a member. During 1910 the Bar held a dinner for 
the appointees to the newly formed Appellate Division, including a future Chief 
Justice, Sir James Rose-Innes. It was attended by Sir Patrick Duncan, a future 
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Governor-General. The speech was made by NJ de Wet, who later also became a 
Chief Justice and was to act as Governor-General during Sir Patrick’s illness. But he 
spoke Dutch. This annoyed some, particularly Sir Patrick, who felt that it was 
inappropriate considering that part of the audience was not fully conversant with 
Dutch. Since then, but not because of this, Afrikaans speakers have been very 
sensitive about the choice of language and have tended to please those who might 
not understand their language. Proof of this conciliatory approach is to be found in 
the fact that General Hertzog, when prime minister, chose Sir Patrick to be 
Governor-General (not that the latter reciprocated when he refused to follow 
convention and disband parliament at the request of Hertzog, but that is another 
matter). Another instance is when counsel in the Supreme Court of Appeal 
responded in English to a question put to him in Afrikaans on the assumption that 
because of the judge’s race he would understand English better. He rephrased his 
answer in Afrikaans after the judge had asked him if he had misunderstood the 
question. 
 
What follows will be the result of a knee-jerk reaction, some experience and a 
smattering of emotion, and will be personal. Some observations will be historical and 
legalistic, and the rest anecdotal. 
 
Many South Africans who descend from ‘European colonialists’ suffer amomg other 
thngs from cultural schizophrenia and have an identity crisis. In my instance my 
father tongue and home language was German, my mother tongue English, and 
Afrikaans is now my home language. It is not possible in those circumstances to be a 
language chauvinist. 
 
After the Norman conquest of Britain the court language and the language of the law 
became Norman-French. It was only after the Normans became anglicized and the 
people homogenized that English (no longer Anglo-Saxon) became the language of 
the law.  
 
Likewise, after the rise of Afrikaner nationalism Afrikaans became an important legal 
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language. This occurred in spite of the fact that Afrikaans is not a ‘White’ language or 
a language of Whites. It is a language that does not and never did belong to a 
particular racial group. But since the demise of Afrikaner nationalism Afrikaans as a 
language of law is in retreat. 
Namibia provides an interesting case. Afrikaans was generally spoken and 
understood by all in South-West Africa. English was used by but a small group of 
persons, primarily as a second or third language. Upon independence Afrikaans, 
perceived as the language of the vanquished conqueror, was replaced with English 
as the only official language.   
 
This says something about Africa. It presents a strange phenomenon. Although 
Africa is usually regarded as uniform it is not because it is divided for international 
political reasons into Arabic, English, French, Portuguese and Spanish speaking 
countries. This division is symbolic of Africa: it is a divided Continent and its official 
languages and legal systems are by and large those of its erstwhile colonial masters 
and not those of its people.  
 
One would, with the rise of African nationalism and the search for an African 
Renaissance, have expected that Africa would have sought to give preference to its 
own languages.  But that has not happened, not even in the odd monolingual African 
country. The colonial language became the language of the elite, and it is used to 
reserve privileges for the new elite – quite like the position in Britain after the Norman 
invasion. As Mosibudi Mangena has said (Sunday Times of 15 August 2010): 
 
The language of debate in parliament and of doing state business must be colonial, 
and the fact that the majority of the people understand neither the language nor the 
colonial way of conducting business does not matter. . . . The languages of the 
colonisers . . . are a mark of success, class, civilisation and a vehicle to access 
resources. 
 
I do not know of any university South of the Sahara that teaches law in a local 
language. Court language, at least in the higher courts, is invariably European. The 
result is that African languages have failed to develop a modern scientific legal 
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vocabulary.  
The one exception is Afrikaans, one of three major languages that developed during 
the 20th Century. Afrikaans was able to create a legal language of its own because 
of its close relationship to Dutch and German in particular and because the common 
law of the country is by a quirk of history Roman-Dutch and not English.  
 
It might be argued, because we have had eleven official languages since 1994 
because of provisions of the interim Constitution, that this picture of the language of 
the law in Africa is skewed, if not untrue, at least as far as South Africa is concerned.  
 
The constitutional provisions about language are often hailed as something 
wonderful, but that is only because they have had a good press agent. They are the 
result of political compromise. Compromises seldom satisfy. Unrealistic compromises 
fail. 
 
South Africa, as a political entity, is a century old. It was a consequence of the Anglo-
Boer War. Another and earlier consequence of the war was the Milner language 
policy: the language of the country had to be English in spite of the fact that the 
official language of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State had been Dutch and 
the unofficial language embryonic Afrikaans. The policy did not succeed. Maybe it is 
a pity that it did not.  
 
The Union of South Africa was created on 31 May 1910. Its Constitution, locally 
devised but an Act of the Westminster Parliament, had a language provision in terms 
of which the official languages of the country were to be English and Dutch, each 
with an equal standing. Afrikaans, as a language, had not yet been formalized and 
was not recognised. The African languages, like the rights of the indigenous peoples, 
did not feature.  
 
Afrikaans grew and during 1925 the Constitution was amended to equate Afrikaans 
with Dutch. In other words, Afrikaans was introduced as an alternative to Dutch and 
very soon Afrikaans replaced Dutch in practical terms. 
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Statutes were always published in both languages. They were signed in either the 
one or the other although the two texts, both of which had to be approved by 
Parliament, had equal status. In the event of an irreconcilable conflict the signed text 
took precedence. 
 
Published judgments of the higher courts and the Appellate Division did not reflect 
the intention of the 1910 Constitution. There are no reported judgments in Dutch. A 
few inconsequential Afrikaans judgments were delivered in that court after the 1930s. 
Except for judgments by the likes of Van den Heever J, who was also a poet, there 
were prior to 1947 hardly any published higher court judgments in Afrikaans. Judge 
Neville Holmes was proud of the fact that he had delivered the first high court 
judgment in Afrikaans in Natal; it was during 1958 (half a century after unification). 
Even in the randomly selected 1948 (2) SA Law Reports, 3 pages (one judgment) 
are in Afrikaans and 1293 pages in English. 
 
A case between what was then an Afrikaans university, the University of Pretoria, 
and the Minister of Education, Mr Jan Hofmeyr, who was Afrikaans, was argued in 
1947. Counsel for the University, Oswald Pirow and Frans Rumpff (the former had 
been a Minister of Justice and the latter became Chief Justice) argued in Afrikaans. 
Counsel for the Minister, although conversant in Afrikaans, argued in English. The 
University lost. The judgment by Malan J was in English. He was Afrikaans-speaking. 
(University of Pretoria v Minister of Education  1948 (1) SA 411, 1948 (4) SA 79) (T).) 
 
Things changed during the late 1950s. Many judges adopted a rule of thumb. 
Judgments were to be in the language of the parties. If their language differed, the 
judgment was in the language of the loser on the basis that a winner is satisfied with 
the result and has less interest in the reasoning. This did not apply to indigenous 
languages because they had no legal status. If someone spoke in one of them the 
proceedings were interpreted from and into one of the official languages. 
 
At the time it was statutorily required that someone who applied to be admitted as an 
advocate had to have completed university courses in Afrikaans, English and Latin. 
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Matters were different, however, after the 1970s, in the so-called independent 
homelands. These chose their own language (isiXhosa for Transkei for instance) and 
English as their official languages. Although they published their laws in their chosen 
indigenous language in addition to English, no one bothered to have regard to the 
former and, in particular, all court proceedings were conducted in English. 
 
Then came the ‘constitutional’ era with its 11 languages. The first victim (some would 
say ‘triumph’) of the language clause was the Latin requirement for advocates, which 
was abolished in 1994. And the abolition of all language requirements for advocates 
followed in 1995. Universities now have a free hand in determining their degree 
requirements. Lawyers without language qualifications? I thought, apparently 
wrongly, that language is the lawyer’s tool. 
 
The re-incorporation of the homelands into mainstream South Africa also had its 
effect. Judicial officers and practitioners from those areas did not know Afrikaans and 
were unable to conduct cases in that language. 
 
Statutes are now prepared in one language only and pass Parliament in that 
language. It is the official text. The language is English, often as she is not usually 
spoken. As a sop to the Constitution, each statute is translated into one of the other 
ten languages but the translation has no value because it has no official status. The 
translations are not even published by commercial law publishers, and since nine of 
the languages do not have their own legal terminology, the task to translate is 
enormous, wasteful and unnecessary. This course of action, prescribed by the 
Constitution,could hardly been seen as a rational choice when one takes into 
account usage, practicality, and expense. 
 
Courts, too, pay lip service to the equality of the eleven official languages.  The Black 
languages retained their status as second-class languages, ie, languages that have 
to be translated or interpreted into English or (to a limited extent) Afrikaans, save for 
a small-scale experiment that is being conducted by the Department of Justice. The 
court languages, accordingly, remained English and Afrikaans, save for the fact that 
Afrikaans is losing ground rapidly, something compouned by the fact that a 
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substantial number of judges are rabidly against the use of Afrikaans as a court 
language. 
  
The rules of the Constitutional Court have two language provisions. The first is that if 
any document is not in an official language ‘understood by all the judges’ it has to be 
translated into that language. The only language understood by all is English. The 
second is that counsel may argue in any official language but if the oral argument is 
to be in a language other than that of the brief, notice has to be given, presumably in 
order to find an interpreter. One judge only, long since retired, has on rare occasions 
written a judgment in Afrikaans. No judgment has been written in any other official 
language save in English.  
 
Importantly, the judgments are not translated into the language of the parties or into 
a second official language. Canada’s ‘bi-juralism’ as practised in the Supreme Court 
ought to have served as example. 
 
There is a knock-on effect. Judges who are conversant with Afrikaans are presented 
with a dilemma. If they write in Afrikaans the judgment would have no precedential 
value because not all students, lawyers or judges would be able to read or 
understand it. The Constitutional Court would have had to judge a translated 
judgment – a translation that the particular judge would not have seen and would not 
know whether or not it was correct. The result of all this is that the practice has 
arisen that judgments are to be in English unless the author is comfortable in 
Afrikaans, the parties and proceedings are in Afrikaans, and the case has no 
precedential value.   
 
The question arises immediately how all of this is compatible with the Constitution. 
The answer is that, although the Constitution declared eleven languages to be 
official languages, it did not give those equal rights or guarantee them equal 
protection. All it does is to state that all official languages must enjoy parity of esteem 
and must be treated equitably. This creates nothing more than something akin to a 
natural obligation in Roman and civil law where the obligation flows from the 
conscience of the debtor: ‘Le véritable base de l’obligation est toujours dans la 
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conscience des contractants.’  
 
In any event, the provision is subject to an overriding proviso: 
 
The national government and provincial governments may use any particular 
official languages for the purposes of government, taking into account usage, 
practicality, expense, regional circumstances and the balance of the needs 
and preferences of the population as a whole or in the province concerned; 
but the national government and each provincial government must use at 
least two official languages. 
 
The problem with the proviso is that it is open to political abuse. The choice of 
languages, if limited to two, will inevitably lead to the dominance of English and the 
rejection of Afrikaans and other relevant languages, irrespective of their prevalence 
in any geographical area. By the way, it would appear that the Constitution does not 
regard Afrikaans as ‘indigenous’, a term reserved for languages that had a 
diminished status before 1994.  
 
Then there is sub-section 6(4) of the Constitution. It requires of the national and 
provincial governments to regulate and monitor their use of official languages. As 
was held by Du Plessis J in Lourens v Die President [2010] ZAGPPHC 19, 
Government has failed to comply with this constitutional duty. It does not appear 
from the judgment that Government was able to explain its lackadaisical approach. It 
probably assumed that if the problem was ignored it would disappear. 
 
A similarly toothless provision in the Bill of Rights relates to education. Everyone has 
the right to receive education in the official language or languages of their choice in 
public educational institutions. However, it must be reasonably practicable. And 
every decision must take into account (a) equity; (b) practicability; and (c) the need 
to redress the results of past racially discriminatory laws and practices. 
 
The fact that one has the right to use one’s language of choice is also meaningless if 
the court cannot understand that language or if what is said or written therein is 
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ignored. Few Black accused are tried in a language they understand and this now 
also applies to Afrikaans-speaking accused. Translated evidence remains suspect. 
 
The huge legal academic contribution in Afrikaans has become as inaccessible as 
Latin texts have become. One sees this in the contributions to law journals. The first 
and foremost Afrikaans law journal, Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse 
Reg, was established in 1938. The contributions were nearly exclusively in Dutch 
and Afrikaans. Today, in spite of its object of nurturing the Afrikaans legal language, 
contributions in Afrikaans fell from 39 per cent in 2005 to 12 per cent in 2010. The 
others are in English. This trend is as strong if not stronger in other disciplines. 
 
In other words, as George Orwell would have said, ‘all languages are equal but 
English is more equal than others.’ The simple fact is that languages in a multi-
cultural society are not equal.  
 
One may agree with Stephen Jay Gould that English has become the lingua franca, 
of scientific discourse (The Hedgehog, the Fox and the Magister’s Pox). In this 
regard it occupies the position of Latin until the beginning of the 19th Century. By the 
way, the Department of Justice, historically and linguistically challenged, refers to 
Roman script on its website as English script.  
 
What has been said thus far may have sounded as a call for special recognition of 
Afrikaans. That is not the intention.  Afrikaans is simply used by way of illustration.  
African languages are in a far worse position. They are simply ignored. 
 
The English author, GK Chesterton, wrote a futuristic novel, The Napoleon of Notting 
Hill, at the beginning of the 20th Century. It was set at the beginning of this century. It 
includes a story about the President of Nicaragua, whose country had disappeared 
through the 'brute powers of modernity'. There were only a few mega-countries left, 
Britain being the foremost. The President, lonely in London, was lamenting the loss 
of his country. The Englishman to whom he spoke explained that the loss was 
inevitable. He said: 
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We do not discourage small nationalities because we wish large nationalities 
to have all their smallness, all their uniformity of outlook, all their exaggeration 
of spirit. If I differ with the greatest respect from your Nicaraguan enthusiasm  
. . . it is because civilization was against you.  We moderns believe in a great 
cosmopolitan civilization . . .. 
 
Chesterton might have been wrong on the future greatness of Britain. But he was 
right with the last sentence, which identifies the problem: the ‘great cosmopolitan 
civilization’; Disneyland culture; cultural colonialism; the global village; and Google 
gobbling. Even a recent French entry at the Eurosong competition was sung in 
English. The world will soon be divided between Mandarin and English.  
 
The role of the law in protecting or promoting language is limited. A love for culture 
cannot be imposed. Culture comes from the heart, from the gut.  If Afrikaans is 
becoming irrelevant it is not because of the law only – it is because the Afrikaans-
speaking population is losing heart or losing its heart. To illustrate: Some years ago a 
new law library was opened at a former Afrikaans university. All of the speakers, from 
the Principal to the Dean were Afrikaans. They spoke English. The only speaker who 
used Afrikaans was Mr Mbeki, then the President. He hardly qualifies as Afrikaans. 
 
The poet NP van Wyk Louw wrote in 1959: ‘Dit wat ons taal sal word, of oor wat van 
hom sal word, kan ons nie praat nie – behalwe met hartstogtelike verlange’ (Van 
Wyk Louw, ‘Laat ons nie roem nie,’ in Versamelde Prosa II p 181). (We cannot speak 
about what our language will become; and we cannot speak about what will become 
of our language – except with a passionate yearning. My translation.) 
 
In this I have stated problems and have not given any answers, simply because I do 
not have any unless, on a lighter note, we adopt a script similar to Sinograms (or 
Han characters) for legal purposes. They can be used by a plurality of languages 
because they represent words and not any particular language or sound.  
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